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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

GERALD JENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

FRANK F.

Case No. 8369

~lOWER,

Def.endant and Appellant.

APPELLAN~r'S

REPLY BRIEF

STAr:rEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Brief made no mention of the injuries
suffered

h~r

peal which

Respondent, as there is no issue in this Apmake~ tlH·

injuries material.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESUMED BY LAW TO BE A
GUEST AND NOT A PASSENGER FOR HIRE, AND PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THAT PRESUMPTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
The following arguments raised 1n Respondent's
Brief, to which we reply, are three fold. Respondent
alleges:
1. The inducement for the rides was the payment
of $3.50 per week, and there was a binding contract between the parties, which establishes plaintiff as a passenger for hire.

2. The purpose of the rides was business, not
social.
3. There is no relationship between the Guest
Statute and the Motor Vehicle Transportation chapter
of the Public Utilities Act.
Replying to the first argument above, we submit
the following:
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Subsection (h) 54-6-12 (pg. 7, App. Brief) presupposes and indeed anticipates a "contract" between the
employees to share the actual expenses. The terms of
the "contract" are established by Statute, and the usual
free enterprise of these parties, in this particular situation, has been eliminated by the legislature.
Further, the "inducement" for the ride goes further
beyond the plaintiff's payment of his proportion of the
expenses; the inducement, more accurately, was the
approval of the legislature to all employees, sanctioning the arrangement as long as they conducted themselves
within the limitations set out in the exception outlined
in subsection (h).
Respondent, furthermore, has failed to carry the
test to its conclusion, as overwhelmingly required by the
authorities, and that is whether the driver and rider, by
the "contract" understood, and the driver acquiesce in
the understanding, that the riders would have a status
which would entail the liability to a passenger for hire.
(pg. 32, App. Brief)
We reiterate our statement at page 33 of Appellant's
Brief to clearly show that the parties, and particularly
the defendant, "\vould certainly have no such understanding.
If all that were required to establish a passenger
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status was the proof of a "contract," there would be very
few instances wherein a rider would be a guest.
If I "offer" to drive n1y wife to the grocery store
and she "accepts," the elements of a contract are present. And it t.akes little imagination to think of a "consideration" sufficient in law to establish the entire "con~
tract" as binding and enforceable. But in the problem
at bar, the element lacking, and necessary, is that certainly neither my wife nor I would understand, by the
longest stretch of the imagination, that she would be a
passenger for hire, rather than a guest.
Everett vs. Burg, 301 :Mich. 734, 4 N. W. 2d 63,
146 A.L.R. 639.
"Practically every interchange of amenities
and hospitality when very carefully analized, may
appear to be a quid pro quo arrangement, but
this does not prevent the relationship from being
that of a host and guest."
And in the Everett case above, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the agreement between 6 employees to share the rides to and from work, 5 of whom
agreed to drive their cars in turn, and the 6th, who had
no car, to pay a weekly sum to the driver, was "simply
the exchange of amenities between employees."
Respondent further contends that the arrangement
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between the parties was business and not social, and
insists that proof of this is found in the fact that the
parties had not met before the time the arrangement
was made upon their first introduction by a fellow employee.
Does Respondent then clain1 that friendship starts
only after people who have been introduced have in fact
known each other for a stated period of timeT Does the
social nature of a relationship of two employees of a
common employer start only when they have attended
a social function together' Is it then untrue that the
spark of friendship can not in fact ignite upon the first
introduction 1
What, in fact, is the nature of an automobile ride
to and from employment 1 Is it a business trip in the
true sense of the word~ The employees are not on duty
while traveling to and from work, as evidenced by our
Compensation Laws. The automobile expenses of the
travel are not recognized by the Internal Revenue Department of the Federal Government, as a deductible
business expense. The State of Utah likewise, refuses
such expense as deductible from income tax. The trips,
then, if not truly "business trips," and if they n1ust be
classified, can only be classified as social.
Respondent insists, at page 6 of his Brief, that the
test approved by the authorities cited, indicates that if
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the carriage tends to the promotion of n1utual interests
of both p.assenger and driver, or if it is prirnarily for
the attainment of some objective or purpose of the
driver, the passenger is not a guest.
In reciting the above argun1ent, Respondent has
bitten his tongue. The rides are neither for the promotion of their n1utual interests nor primarily for the objective of the defendant. The fellow mnployees had a
common interest in getting to work, but they certainly
had no mutual interest in so doing. For example,
Wliliams had no "interest," other than perhaps friendly
concern, that Mr. Gull be at work, as Mr. Williams would
be paid, and would suffer no other detriment to himself,
whether ~{r. Gull worked or not: And the same thing
applies in reverse, and as between any two, or all of
thr. occupants of the car.
"'Mutual is not synonymous with "common."
The latter word ... denotes that which is shared,
in the same or different degrees, by two or more
persons; but the former implies reciprocal action
or interdependent connection." Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd. Ed.
There is no more mutuality of interest in a group
of employees riding to and from work together, than
there would be if they were en route to or from a fishing
trip, and had agreed in advance to share the actual
expenses of the transportation.
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Obviously the Respondent cannot claim that the
trips were "primarily for the .attaimnent of some objective or purpose of the driver." The Legislature cannot be accused of attempting to benefit the driver-employees as against the employees who ride. Their refusal to allow the driver to make any profit, and their
requirement that the drivers pay their share of the expense along with the riders, is conclusive against .any
such contention.
It needs no argument that the trips were not "primarily for the purpose of getting the defendant to work,"
but rather, they were "primarily" and solely arranged to
get everyone to and from work in as economical and
convenient a manner as possible.

The Respondent further argues to the effect that
there is no relationship between the Guest and Motor
Vehicle Transportation Acts.
In the first place, we wish to correct Respondent on
his understanding of our contentions, as recited in pages
11 and 12 of his Brief.
We certainly do not concede that had this accident
occurred prior to 1948, plaintiff would have been a passenger for hire. We submit that without the Statutory
enactment in 1948, the Courts would be confronted with
a closer problem as to whether, in fact, the sums agreed
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to be paid, in light with the other fact~, constituted
•· c01npensation" under the meaning of the Gue~t Law.
Furthennore, without the statutory exception (h),
the parties conceivably would have been free to bargain
with each other on the an1ount to be paid, which Inay or
may not have constituted "compensation" under the
particular facb. And under such conditions of freedom,
the Court conceivably could take the position, as some
Courts have, that any consideration, whether 1c or $5.00
would constitute "compensation," inas1nuch as the Court
generally will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration.
Under those conditions, whether the driver did or
did not secure a license from the Public Utilities Commission would be as imm.aterial as whether or not he
secured a driver's license.
The obvious reply to Respondent's argument is that
any two Laws, passed by a State Legislature, covering
the subject of nwtor vehicles, can hardly disclaim relationship to each other when the facts either fall under
one Statute or the other. The purposes and 1ne.aning
of the Legislature, in passing each Act, 1nust then be
inquired into.
As one exan1ple only, The Safety Responsibility Act,
Chapter 12, Title 41, U.C.A. 1953, ties the two above
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~cts

together, as far as "Relationship" is concerned.

The Safety Responsibility Act, to use very general
,erms, is a recognition by the Legislature that public
)Olicy dictates that the public be protected for injuries
>r damages suffered as a result of the ordinary negligmce of motorists.
The Public Utilities Act, for the same reason, reIUires financial responsibility on the part of operators
)£ vehicles for hire.
The guest Statute, 1n effect, provides that guests
ln a vehicle shall assume the risk of the host's ordinary
1egligence and, therefore, no financial responsibility,
r1aturally, need be shown.
Thereby lies the relationship.
Did the Legislature then intend to protect the public,
those employees riding to and from work? If
Respondent's contentions are correct, that question would
be answered in the affirmative, for the reasons; (again
~peaking generally)
~xcept

1. The general public is protected for the negligence
[)f the private motorist, who must carry liability insurmce.
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2. Guests, however, 1nust assu1ne the risk, and,
therefore, a fortiori, no insurance is required to protect
them.
3. Operators of vehicles for hire must carry
liability insurance on the vehicle for hire.
4. But employees, under subsection (h), need not
carry insurance (except under 1 above), as they are not
operating a vehicle for hire.
There .are, of course, other reasons why there is
a "relationship" between the two Acts in question, hut
we will not belabor the obvious.
On the other Points at issue, Appellant submits his
appeal on his original Brief.
Respectfully submitted,

LOllS E. MIDGLEY,
Attor-ney for Defendant
and Appellant
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